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The paper examines the possible impact of Doha agreement on Philippine 
poverty. Using a detailed CGE analysis, the agreement is observed to depress world 
demand for Philippine agricultural exports, and thus slightly increase poverty, especially 
among rural households. However, an ambitious full trade liberalization scenario, which 
involves free world trade and domestic liberalization, leads to increased industrial exports 
that favor urban households. These impacts are driven primarily by domestic trade 
liberalization, as free world trade favors the agricultural sector by increasing the cost of 




Since the early 1980s, the Philippines has undertaken substantial trade reform. 
The current Doha round of WTO negotiations is now likely to bring further reform and 
shocks to world import and export prices and world export demand. The impact of all 
these developments on the poor is not very clear and is the subject of intense debate.  
A detailed economy-wide CGE model is used to run a series of policy 
experiments. Poverty is found to increase slightly with the implementation of expected 
Doha scenario. These effects are focused primarily among rural households in the wake 
of falling world prices and demand for Philippine agricultural exports.  
The impacts of full liberalization – involving free world trade and complete 
domestic liberalization – are found to depend strongly on the mechanism the government 
adopts to offset foregone tariff revenue. If an indirect tax is used, the incidence of poverty 
falls marginally, but the depth (poverty gap) and severity (squared poverty gap) increase 
substantially. If, instead, an income tax is used, all measures of poverty increase. 
Regardless of the compensatory mechanism, full liberalization favors urban households, 
as exports, which are primarily non-agricultural, expand. 
In separate simulations, we discover that free world trade is poverty-reducing and 
favors rural households, whereas domestic liberalization is poverty-increasing and favors 
urban households. Under free world trade, rural households benefit from increasing world 
agricultural export prices and demand. The anti-rural bias of domestic liberalization   iii
stems from the fact that import prices fall more for agricultural goods than for industrial 
goods, as initial import-weighted average tariffs rates are higher for the former. 
In conclusion, the current Doha agreement appears likely to slightly increase 
poverty, especially in rural areas and among the unemployed, self-employed and rural 
low-educated. The Philippines is found to have every interest in pushing for more 
ambitious world trade liberalization, as free world trade holds out strong promise for 
reducing poverty. In contrast, domestic liberalization is found to likely increase poverty, 
suggesting that accompanying policies should be considered such as tying domestic 
liberalization to progress in free world trade. Whereas free world trade favors rural 
households and actually increases urban poverty, the opposite is true of domestic 
liberalization. This suggests that some regional compensatory policies should be 
considered. Similar contrasting effects are noted according to the employment status of 
the household head – salaried vs. unemployed or self-employed; skilled vs. unskilled – 
implying that targeted accompanying policies may be important.   iv
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DOHA SCENARIOS, TRADE REFORMS, AND POVERTY IN THE 
PHILIPPINES: A CGE ANALYSIS 
 
Caesar B. Cororaton, John Cockburn, and Erwin Corong
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1980s, the Philippines has undertaken substantial trade reform 
wherein tariff rates have been reduced, tariff structure simplified, and quantitative 
restrictions “tariffied”. The current Doha round of WTO negotiations is now likely to 
bring major changes for the Philippines, particularly its agriculture sector, as well as 
pressure for further liberalization of its trade policies. The impact of all these 
developments on the poor is not very clear and is the subject of intense debate. Will the 
outcome of the Doha Round, together with further Philippine trade liberalization, be 
favorable or harmful for the poor? Will the effects differ between different types of poor? 
What alternative or accompanying policies may be used in order to ensure a more 
equitable distribution of the gains from freer trade? What are the channels through which 
these changes are most likely to affect the poor? These are examples of very challenging 
concerns that occupy the ongoing debate on trade reforms. We employ a 35-sector CGE 
model calibrated to Philippine data to analyze the impacts of various WTO-Doha and 
Philippine trade reform scenarios on resource allocation, factor demands and factor 
prices, household income, consumer prices and poverty. Given the agricultural focus of 
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the Doha Round, particular attention is paid to disaggregating and modeling the 
agriculture sector.  
2.  SURVEY OF LITERATURE   
There are two recent survey of literature that looks into the link between trade and 
poverty: (1) Winters, McCulloch, and Mckay (2004); and (2) Hertel, and Reimer (2004). 
Both surveys analyze the theoretical link and cite empirical evidence so far. In particular, 
the link between trade and poverty may be found in: (a) price and availability of goods; 
(b) factor prices, income and employment; (c) government taxes and transfers influenced 
by changes in revenue from trade taxes; (d) incentives for investment and innovation, 
which affect long-run economic growth; (e) external shocks, in particular changes in the 
terms of trade; and (f) short-run risk and adjustment cost. There are various methods of 
analysis employed which can be grouped into: partial equilibrium models/cost-of-living 
analysis, general equilibrium models, and models on trade, growth and poverty. So far, 
the empirical evidence indicates that there can be no simple general conclusion about the 
relationship between trade liberalization and poverty. The present paper falls under the 
general equilibrium method, in particular in the CGE-poverty literature. In terms of the 
trade and poverty link, the paper traces the impact of changes in factor prices on 
household income, compares two compensatory tax schemes to offset the possible lose in 
government revenue from tariff reduction, and analyzes the possible changes in the terms 
of trade arising from the Doha agreement.   3
In this section, we shall not delve into the empirical results in the literature on 
trade and poverty. Instead, we shall mention that there have been numerous attempts to 
adapt CGE models to the analysis of income distribution and poverty issues. Generally, 
one must impose strong assumptions concerning the distribution of income among 
household in each category. A popular approach is to assume a lognormal distribution of 
income within each category where the variance is estimated with the base year data (De 
Janvry, Sadoulet, and Fargeix 1991). In this approach, the CGE model is used to estimate 
the change in the average income for each household category, while the variance of this 
income is assumed fixed. Decaluwé et al (2000) argue that a beta distribution is 
preferable to other distributions because it can be skewed left or right and thus may better 
represent the types of intra-category income distributions commonly observed. In this 
paper, we do not impose assumption concerning the functional form of the distribution of 
income among households. Instead, we take the actual distribution of income within the 
12 household categories in the model from the 1994 Family Income and Expenditure 
Survey (FIES) which comprise 24,797 Filipino households. The 12 household categories 
are obtained by grouping households by region (urban-rural), the education of the 
household head and his/her occupation. Averages household income variations are 
derived for each household category from the CGE and then applied to all corresponding 
households in the FIES to compute FGT poverty indices. 
There have been a number of CGE analyses conducted to analyze the effects of 
policy reforms in the Philippines. Cororaton (1994) provided a review of literature on 
CGE modeling in the Philippines. The review highlights that although there are a number   4
of CGE models available in the country
2 with various sectoral breakdown, it was 
observed that most of these models focused mainly on analyzing production efficiency 
and reallocation effects. The analysis of tracing down the impact of trade reforms to the 
household level has not been emphasized or has been completely missed out. The paper 
attempts to address this gap within the context of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). 
3.  BACKGROUND ON PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURE 
  The agricultural sector employs about 35 percent of the labor force and accounts 
for roughly 20 percent of GDP. If linkages with sectors such as agricultural-related 
processing, including food processing and the farm supply industry are added, the farm 
and food related industry contributes 40 percent of GDP and employs two-thirds of the 
labor force (David 1997). The sector has been characterized by low productivity and 
correspondingly low growth rates in the last two decades. Growth decelerated from an 
annual average of 6.7 percent in the 1970s to 1.1 percent in the first half of the 1980s 
(Table 1). Although the second half of the 1980s saw some recovery, agriculture again 
lost steam in the 1990s with an annual growth rate of just 2 percent. 
  The Green revolution was the main driving force behind the high growth in the 
1970s. However, because of an inherent policy bias against agriculture, coupled with the 
collapse in world commodity prices, the growth momentum was not sustained. David 
(2003) concludes that the negative impact of government's anti-agriculture policy bias 
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was greater than that of declining world commodity prices. The policy bias towards 
import substitution and against agriculture and exports led to market distortions which 
promoted rent seeking activities and distorted economic incentives against investments in 
agriculture up to the 1970s. Moreover, the policy of maintaining an overvalued exchange 
in support of industrial policy greatly penalized and reduced the rates of return to 
agriculture (Intal and Power 1990).  
Table 1—Growth Rates of Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry 
 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95  1995-2000
Agriculture  6.7 6.7 1.1 3.1 2.0 2.3
    Crops   
- Palay 3.8 5.2 3.6 3.6 2.0  4.3
- Corn 7.1 5.0 3.7 5.4 -0.5  0.5
- Sugarcane 7.7 0.1 -3.5 -5.8 1.6  0.5
- Coconut 11.1 11.1 0.0 -8.7 0.9  0.0
- Banana 12.5 20.2 0.8 -4.8 -0.5  6.0
- Other Crops  8.7 6.8 0.5 5.5 1.7  0.9
    Livestock  0.0 -1.5 1.3 6.1 3.3  4.7
    Poultry  7.4 13.5 3.0 8.0 6.4  5.1
    Agricultural Services  0.0 6.7 2.8 8.7 1.0  -0.5
Fishery  4.3 4.2 5.1 1.0 2.6 1.3
Forestry  -6.8 -2.6 -11.4 -6.0 -23.3 -9.2
Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry  3.1 4.5 0.4 2.0 1.3  1.9
Source: National Statistical and Coordination Board. 
 
Agriculture exports were a major source of foreign exchange in the country in the 
1970s. The sector as a whole was a net exporter, contributing two-thirds of total exports 
and representing only 20 percent of total imports, thereby providing the foreign exchange 
needed to support the import dependent manufacturing sector (Intal and Power 1990). 
However, the 1990s saw a clear change in agricultural trade patterns as exports stagnated 
and imports increased dramatically to the point that the Philippines became a net importer 
of agricultural goods. David (2003) attributes this evolution to the country’s fading 
comparative advantage and low productivity levels in agriculture. Table 2 indicates that   6
the country’s declining comparative advantage in agriculture can be traced primarily to 
primary agricultural goods where exports have gone from 1400 percent of imports in 
1970 to 50 percent in 1998. 
 
Table 2—Philippine Agricultural Exports and Imports 1970-1998 ($US million CIF) 
 
 Primary    Processed    Raw  Materials    Inputs    Total 
  Imports Exports  Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports   Imports  Exports
1970  51.3 724.6   111.9 123.9 33.0 35.7 33.7 -   229.9  884.2
1975  210.8 951.8   208.6 285.0 71.5 57.7 124.4 -   615.3 1294.5
1980 351.0  1242.8    324.8  790.0 76.6 86.9 215.2 -   985.6 2119.7
1985  359.0 572.5   211.1 633.5 104.7 94.2 144.9 -   819.7 1300.3
1990  800.7 806.0   564.9 675.8 166.8 145.1 232.0 -   1764.4 1626.8
1995 1349.2 988.4    984.0  1234.9 271.8 172.2 379.5 -   3029.4 2395.5
1996 1803.8 981.4    1030.8  1015.4 245.7 199.9 420.8 -   3501.1 2196.7
1997 1738.4 914.7    1152.7  1127.0 288.9 192.8 424.8 -   3604.6 2234.5
1998 1877.3 886.9    862.8  1120.9 200.6 136.2 289.0 -   3229.6 2143.9
Source: David (2000).  
4.  POST WORLD WAR II TRADE POLICIES 
The balance of payments crisis (BOP) that transpired barely four years after the 
war ended in 1945 shaped the Philippine industrial and agricultural policy landscape. 
High import demand for economic reconstruction coupled with distressed local 
production led to a decline in international reserves and the 1949 BOP crisis. The crisis 
spurred a policy response centered on import and foreign exchange controls through the 
identification of essential imports, the imposition of import quotas, as well as the 
allocation of scarce foreign exchange. Though initially intended to be a temporary 
measure, these policy responses soon became a prominent fixture that resulted in a 
development strategy geared towards industrial import substitution with lesser emphasis 
on the agricultural and export sectors.    7
Import Substitution. The enactment of the highly protective 1957 tariff code 
reinforced the government’s import substitution policy by providing incentives to 
domestic producers of final consumer goods. High tariff rates were imposed on non-
essential consumer goods while low rates were applied to essential producer inputs. This 
created a strong bias against agriculture and exports. An analysis of effective protection 
rates (EPR) by sector and commodity (Power and Sicat 1971; Tan 1979) revealed that the 
highest EPRs from the 1950s to 1970s were granted to import substituting consumer 
industries; in contrast agriculture and primary (mining) products, which accounted for 
two-thirds of exports during the period, were characterized by the lowest EPRs. The 
weighted average EPRs provided to the manufacturing sector was 44 percent in 1974 
compared to a much lower nine percent protection for agriculture and mining. Moreover, 
Tan (1979) revealed a highly skewed protection structure: (a) exportable goods, which 
comprised mainly of agricultural products, had four percent protection as compared to 61 
percent for non-exportable; and (b) consumption goods had 77 percent protection as 
compared to 23 percent and 18 percent for intermediate and capital goods respectively. In 
spite of the passage of the revised 1973 tariff code, which was primarily aimed at 
decreasing tariff dispersion, large disparity in tariff levels persisted, especially by South 
East Asian standards. 
Export Taxes on Agriculture. Agricultural export taxes ranging from 4 to 10 
percent were introduced following the 1970 devaluation to stabilize the BOP position. 
Initially intended to be temporary, the agricultural export tax ended up being incorporated 
in the 1973 tariff and customs code as a major source of government revenue. The world   8
commodity prices boom in 1974 prompted the imposition of an additional export tax to 
enhance government revenue. Not surprisingly, this worsened the bias against 
agriculture, resulting in additional resource reallocation from agriculture to other sectors 
of the economy, particularly towards the import substituting consumer goods (Intal and 
Power 1990). Furthermore, the dispersion in tariff rates openly encouraged assembly 
operations that focused mainly on the production of import dependent, low value added 
products. Overall, this did not only prevent the growth of the agricultural and primary 
sectors, but also the evolution of desirable backward integration (Bautista and Tecson 
2003). 
Overvaluation of Exchange Rate. The overvalued exchange rate arising from the 
highly protective trade policy regime also contributed to the bias against agriculture. This 
occurred despite the removal of exchange rate controls in 1960 and the de facto 
devaluations of 1962 and 1970. The overvaluation of the peso varied significantly, from 
14 percent from 1962 to 1966, to as high as 32 percent from 1975 to 1979 (Intal and 
Power 1990). The overvaluation of the exchange rate resulted in negative protection rates 
for rice, sugar and coconut range from -13 percent to -33 percent. This significantly 
reduced the returns to agricultural production (Intal and Power 1990). 
Government Intervention. Government interventions in the input markets further 
exacerbated the anti-agriculture bias. Input prices of fertilizers, hand tractors, and 
irrigation pumps were higher than their corresponding world prices by 10, 33 and 30 
percent, respectively (David 1983). Government pricing and marketing interventions in 
agriculture, purportedly aimed at protecting the domestic economy from instability in   9
world commodity prices, led to the establishment of government marketing agencies that 
had monopoly power for imports and monopsony power for exports. In reality, they 
siphoned off the gains from trade by diverting proceeds from agricultural producers and 
creating rent-seeking activities (Bautista and Tecson 2003). In particular, heavy 
restrictions on trading of food grains (rice, corn, and wheat), coconut and sugar reduced 
domestic prices. For instance, the government controlled the allocation among producers 
of exports and domestic sugar sales, with domestic sales further forced to sell at below-
world prices. The establishment of a de facto government-funded coconut ‘parastatal’ 
with substantial monopsony power took advantage of the favorable international market 
at the expense of domestic coconut producers. Similarly, a government food grain 
marketing agency reduced the returns to domestic producers as the agency controlled the 
domestic price of food grains. 
5.  PHILIPPINE TRADE REFORM 
This pattern of intervention in the Philippine economy was not sustainable and it 
is hardly surprising that reforms became necessary. The first phase of the trade reform 
program (TRP) started in the early 1980s with three major components: (a) the 1981-85 
tariff reduction; (b) the import liberalization program (ILP); and (c) the complimentary 
realignment of the indirect taxes. During this period the maximum tariff rates were 
reduced from 100 to 50 percent and sales taxes on imports and locally produced goods 
were equalized. The mark–up applied on the value of imports (for sales tax valuation) 
was also reduced and eventually eliminated.    10
The implementation of TRP however was suspended in the mid–1980s because of 
a balance of payments crisis. In fact, some of the items that were deregulated earlier were 
re–regulated during the period. When the Aquino government took over the 
administration in 1986 the TRP of the early 1980s was resumed, resulting in the 
reduction of the number of regulated items from 1,802 in 1985 to 609 in 1988. Export 
taxes on all products except logs were also abolished. 
In 1991 the government launched TRP–II, which sought to realign tariff rates 
over a five–year period. The realignment involved the narrowing of the tariff rates 
through a reduction of tariff peaks, with a goal of clustering of tariff rates within the 10-
30 percent range by 1995. This resulted in a near equalization of protection for 
agriculture and manufacturing by the start of the 1990s, reinforced by the introduction of 
protection to "sensitive" agricultural products.  
  In 1992, a program of converting quantitative restrictions (QRs) into tariff 
equivalents was initiated. In the first stage, QRs of 153 commodities were converted into 
tariffs. In a number of cases, tariff rates were raised over 100 percent, especially during 
the initial years of the conversion. However, a built–in program for reducing tariff rates 
over a five–year period was also put into effect. QRs were removed for a further 286 
commodities in the succeeding stage. At the end of 1992 only 164 commodities were 
subjected to QRs. There were some policy reversals along the way though. In 1993, QRs 
were re-introduced for 93 items, largely as a result of the Magna Carta for Small Farmers 
in 1991.   11
In 1994, the government started implementing TRP–III at the same time as it was 
admitted to the WTO. Tariff rates were successively reduced on: capital equipment and 
machinery (January 1, 1994); textiles, garments, and chemical inputs (September 30, 
1994); 4,142 manufacturing goods (July 22, 1995) and “non-sensitive” components of the 
agricultural sector (January 1, 1996). Through these programs, the number of tariff tiers 
was reduced, as were the maximum tariff rates. In particular, the overall program was 
aimed at establishing a four-tier tariff schedule: 3 percent for raw materials and capital 
equipment that are not available locally; 10 percent for raw materials and capital 
equipment that are available from local sources; 20 percent for intermediate goods; and 
30 percent for finished goods. This further reduced the anti-agriculture tariff bias which 
by 1995 had turned into effective protection for agriculture (Habito 1999). Indeed, EPRs 
in agriculture and industry went from 9 and 44 percent, respectively, in 1979 to 25 and 20 
percent in 1999, and to 24 and 15 percent by the year 2000 (Bautista, Power and 
Associates 1979; Manasan and Pineda 1999; Habito 2002).  
  Between 1994 and 2000, the overall weighted nominal tariff declined by 66.9 
percent (Table 3). The decline in the industry tariff (-65.3 percent) was much greater than 
in agriculture (-48.8 percent). The largest drop in tariff rates was in mining (-88.9 
percent), while the smallest decline was in "other agriculture" (-19.9 percent). In 2000, 
the average sectoral tariff rate was highest in food manufacturing (16.6 percent), whereas 
‘other agriculture’ sector had the lowest tariff rate (0.2 percent).  12 
Table 3—Nominal Tariff Rates 
 1994  2000  Percent  change 
Crops 15.9  8.7  -45.6 
Livestock 0.7  0.3  -57.6 
Fishing 34.1  80  -76.4 
Other Agriculture  0.3  0.2  -19.9 
AGRICULTURE  8.8 4.5  -48.8 
Mining 44.1  4.9  -88.9 
Food manufacturing  37.3  16.6  -55.4 
Non-food manufacturing  21.1  7.6  -64.0 
INDUSTRY  24.1 8.4  -65.3 
TOTAL  23.9 7.9  -66.9 
Sources of data for calculation: Various issues of Foreign Trade Statistics, and Manasan and Querubin (1997). 
 
Revenue from import tariff is one of the major sources of government funds. In 
1990, the share of revenue from import duties and taxes to the total revenue was 26.4 
percent (Table 4). It increased marginally to 27.7 percent in 1995, but then dropped 
sharply to 19.3 percent in 2000, largely due to the tariff reduction program. The reduction 
in the share of tariff revenue was compensated primarily by an increase in the share of 
income and profit taxes from 27.3 percent in 1990 to 30.7 percent in 1995 and 38.6 
percent in 2000. The share of excise and sales taxes dropped from 27.2 percent in 1990 to 
23.4 percent in 1995, but then recovered to 28.1 percent in 2000. 
Table 4—Sources of Government Revenue 
   1990 1995 2000 
Tax Revenue  83.9 85.7 89.1 
Taxes on net Income and  Profits  27.3 30.7 38.6 
Excise and Sales Taxes  27.2  23.4  28.1 
Import Duties and other Import  Taxes  26.4 27.7 19.3 
Other  Taxes  3.0 3.9 3.1 
Non-Tax Revenue  14.8 14.0 10.6 
Grants  1.3 0.3 0.3 
Total  100.0 100.0    100.0 
Source: Selected Philippine Economic Indicators. 
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6. POVERTY  PROFILE 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the poverty headcount index and the Gini 
coefficient from 1985 to 2000. The poverty headcount index dropped continuously from 
49.2 percent in 1985 to 36.9 percent in 1997, but then rebounded to 39.5 percent in 2000 
as a result of the 1998 El Nino and the Asian Crisis. El Nino resulted in a 30 percent 
contraction in agriculture, the greatest drop in more than 30 years. On the hand, income 
inequality has steadily increased over this period, as the Gini coefficient climbs from 0.42 
in 1985 to 0.51 in 2000.  
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  In 1994, the base year the household survey underlying our analysis, about 41 
percent of the population of 67 million was below the poverty threshold (Table 5). 
Generally, rural households, which represent roughly half the population, are 
substantially poorer than urban households. Whether in urban or rural areas, households 
with low-educated heads are by far the poorest. These four household categories (low-  14
educated salaried and self-employed households in rural and urban areas) combine to 
encompass more than 60 percent of the total population of the Philippines and the bulk of 
the poor.  
Table 5—Poverty Indices in 1994 
 
Households  Population  Share of population Headcount Gap  Severity 
Low-ed salaried  6.5 9.6 41.7 12.9 5.6
Hi-ed salaried  6.4 9.4 15.5 3.7 1.3
Civil servants  3.2 4.7 10.2 2.5 0.9
Low-ed self/un-employed  9.4 14 42.3 14.9 6.9
Hi-ed self/un-employed  6.2 9.2 16.9 4.8 2.1
Family business  1.9 2.8 18.2 6.0 2.8
   Total-Urban  33.6 49.7 28.0 8.9 3.9
Low-ed salaried  6.5 9.7 58.7 19.7 8.8
Hi-ed salaried  1.9 2.8 31.3 9.7 4.3
Civil servants  1.6 2.4 22.4 6.8 2.9
Low-ed self/un-employed  18.1 26.8 61.0 21.9 10.3
Hi-ed self/un-employed  3.3 5 37.5 12.0 5.0
Family business  2.4 3.6 39.9 12.0 5.2
   Total-Rural  33.8 50.3 53.2 18.4 8.4
Total-Philippines 67.4 100 40.7 13.7 6.2
Source: 1994 Family Income and Expenditure Survey. 
Legend: low-ed – zero education to third year high school; hi-ed – high school graduate and up. 
 
7.  THE MODEL: SPECIFICATION, PARAMETERS AND ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE 
Basic Structure. The model has 35 production sectors, with 13 sectors for 
agriculture, fishing and forestry, 19 for industry, and three for service sectors, including 
government service. In the agricultural sector, the model distinguishes capital, land and 
four types of labor inputs: skilled (high school diploma) and unskilled agricultural labor, 
and skilled and unskilled production workers. Agricultural workers are employed only in 
agriculture, while production workers employed in agriculture are mobile between the   15
farm and non-farm sectors. Non-agricultural sectors, except government service, use 
capital as well as skilled and unskilled production worker inputs. Sectoral capital is fixed. 
Sectoral intermediate input is determined using a Leontief fixed coefficient, whereas the 
components of value added are aggregated using a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function.  
Figure 2 shows the basic price relationships in the model. Output price, px, affects 
export price, pe, and local prices, pl. Indirect taxes are added to the local price to 
determine domestic prices, pd, which together with import price, pm, will determine the 
composite price, pq. The composite price is the price paid by the consumers. Import 
price, pm, is in domestic currency, which is affected by the world price of imports, 
exchange rate, er, tariff rate, tm, and indirect tax rate, itx. All prices adjust to clear the 
factor and product markets. Consumer demand is derived from CD utility functions. An 
Armington-CES (constant elasticity substitution) function is assumed allocates this 
demand between local and imported goods, while a CET (constant elasticity of 
transformation) function determines the allocation of domestic production between 
export supply and local sales. A downward-sloping export demand curve is assumed. 16 

















Model Closure. Nominal government consumption is equal to exogenous real 
government consumption multiplied by its (endogenous) price. Fixing real government 
spending neutralizes any possible welfare/poverty effects of variations in government 
spending. Total government income is held fixed. Any reduction in government income 
from tariff reduction is compensated endogenously by the introduction of an additional 
uniform sales or income tax. Thus, the government's budget balance (public savings) is 
endogenously determined, although the only variations are due to changes in the nominal 
price of government consumption. 
Total nominal investment is equal to exogenous total real investment multiplied 
by its price. Total real investment is held fixed in order to abstract from inter-temporal 
welfare/poverty effects. The price of total real investment is endogenous. The current 
account balance (foreign savings) is held fixed and the nominal exchange rate is the 
model's numéraire. The foreign trade sector is effectively cleared by changes in the real 














price (pq)   17
export prices, divided by the domestic price index. The propensities to save of the various 
household groups in the model adjust proportionately to accommodate the fixed total real 
investment assumption. This is done through a factor in the household saving function 
that adjusts endogenously. 
  Economic Structure. The sectoral export demand curve elasticities used in the 
model are equal to the Armington elasticity estimates used in the GTAP model
3 (Hertel et 
al 2004). The sectoral CES and CET elasticities in the model in turn are derived as one-
half of the Armington elasticities in the GTAP (Table 6). Total exports in 1994 are 
composed of 6.1 percent agriculture exports, 63.1 percent industrial exports, and 30.8 
percent service sector exports. The principal industrial exports are semi-conductors and 
textile-garments. The semi-conductor industry is highly export intensive, followed by 
coconut processing, bananas and textile-garments. 98.5 percent of total imports are 
industrial. The sectors which are highly import-intensive are mining (75.3 percent; 
mainly due to crude oil imports), semi-conductors, machinery, and fertilizer
4. While 
agriculture generally has higher value-added ratio compared to industry, its contribution 
to the overall value added is relatively small. Agriculture contributes 19.9 percent of 
domestic value added (GDP), as compared to industry (31.5 percent) and services (48.5 
percent). Labor intensity is uniformly higher in the agricultural sectors, with the 
exception of fishing and "other livestock".  
                                                      
3 The appendix gives a discussion of how the Philippine model is linked with the GTAP model. 
4 The Philippines does not produce all items in the semi-conductor sector, but instead imports these items. 
For example, it does not have the facilities to produce wafers (motherboards) and monitors, which are 
major parts of computers. Domestic production focuses on hard disks, disk drives, processors, and some 
chips. Thus, while there is substantial domestic production and exports in the semi-conductor sector, there 
are also substantial imports. 18 
Table 6—Elasticities and Key Parameters (1994)  
 
         Foreign Trade    Production (percent) 
  GTAP    Exports (percent) *    Imports(percent) *      VA Share Lab-Cap
   Elasticities     Share  Intensities     Share Intensities   (VA/X)i  (VAi/VA) Ratio** 
Irrigated Palay  10.1        0.00 0.0  73.9 1.95 0.94
Non-irrigated  Palay  10.1           93.0 0.83 2.07
Corn 2.6  0.01 0.24  0.16 3.9  79.7 1.09 2.15
Banana 3.7  1.25 58.96        62.9 0.49 3.28
Fruit 3.7  0.73 13.57  0.40 7.2  75.9 1.52 1.63
Coconut 3.7  0.36 10.74        86.5 1.07 3.02
Sugarcane  5.4           71.9 0.56 1.14
Other agricultural crops  6.5  0.67 7.08  0.17 1.7  78.4 2.81 1.46
Hog 4.0        0.57 6.5  56.0 1.59 1.09
Poultry products  4.0  0.00 0.0  0.04 0.4  55.6 1.83 0.96
Other livestock  3.1  0.02 0.4 0.03 0.6  74.0 1.39 0.50
Fishing 2.5  3.09 21.6  0.03 0.2  71.7 3.80 0.58
Other Agriculture  6.8        0.12 2.9  77.0 0.99 2.30
AGRICULTURE        6.13      1.51         19.9  
Mining 12.7  2.51 50.2  8.22 75.3  55.0 1.02 0.88
Meat Processing  8.3  0.09 0.7 0.97 6.4  28.5 1.43 0.30
Fruit/vegetable canning  4.0  1.36 30.8  0.18 5.3  36.9 0.60 0.87
Fish processing  8.8  2.03 41.9 0.03 1.0  24.5 0.42 0.75
Coconut processing  4.0  2.93 65.6 0.43 21.0  22.3 0.36 0.90
Rice & corn milling  5.2  0.03 0.2 0.19 0.9  32.3 2.44 0.29
Sugar milling & refining  5.4  0.38 9.8 0.26 6.6  30.1 0.43 0.85
Beverages, sugar, etc  2.8  0.20 4.0 0.20 3.9  45.7 0.83 0.53
Other food processing  4.8  1.31 6.2 4.81 19.1  29.3 2.22 0.80
Textile and garments  7.6  12.08 57.0 8.56 46.1  36.3 2.81 0.81
Wood/paper products  6.3  3.72 32.8 5.28 39.5  34.8 1.43 0.61
Fertilizer 6.6  0.49 42.2  1.24 64.0  33.5 0.14 0.48
Other chemicals  6.6  1.87 14.4 10.24 46.3  40.7 1.95 0.35
Petroleum products  4.2  1.09 6.0 3.48 16.8  20.2 1.32 0.48
Metal products  7.3  6.06 49.5 8.44 56.4  23.7 1.05 0.47
Semi-conductors 8.8  14.09 76.2 12.53 73.0  24.9 1.66 0.73
Machinery (inc. cars)  7.4  6.56 39.5  24.76 70.9  19.8 1.15 0.80
Other manufacturing  6.8  5.85 39.4 8.66 46.7  37.6 2.03 0.79
Construction/utilities 4.7  0.45 1.1        52.9 8.24 0.58
INDUSTRY        63.10      98.49         31.5  
Wholesale trade  3.8  12.99 21.7        64.1 14.24 0.51
Other service  3.8  17.78 15.2       61.4 26.64 0.37
Government  services  3.8           69.0 7.67 
SERVICES     30.8                         48.5    
TOTAL        100.0      100.0                 100.0   
Notes: *: export intensity is the ratio of exports to domestic production whereas import intensity is the ratio  
           of imports to domestic consumption; **: lab-cap is the labor-capital ratio; va: value added; x: output  19 
8.  DEFINITION OF SCENARIOS 
The paper utilizes two sets of results. One set is generated from the GTAP model 
and another from the Philippine CGE model. The first model generates results concerning 
about the possible changes in the external environment due to Doha facing the Philippine 
economy. Given such external environment, the second model calculates the potential 
impact on the Philippine economy, particularly on poverty. Appendix A discusses how 
the models are linked. 
The GTAP model analyzes the various Doha scenarios. Based on the aggressive 
interpretation of the July 2004 Framework of DDA, Anderson and Martin (2005) suggest 
a tiered formula for reductions in tariffs, domestic support and full elimination of 
agricultural exports subsidies. However, if the reduction is focused solely on tariff bound 
rates without consideration of the applied rates, tariff discontinuities could arise. To avoid 
such tariff discontinuities in the reduction of bound tariffs, applied tariff will be reduced 
only when and to the extent that the new bound rate is below the initial applied rate. 
Furthermore, the tiered formula is applied to various inflexion points and marginal cuts, 
depending upon the level of development. For developed countries the inflexion points 
are at 15 and 90 percent and the marginal cuts are 45, 70, and 75 percent. For developing 
countries the inflexion points are placed at 20, 60, and 120 percent, and with marginal 
cuts of 35, 40, 50, and 60 percent. Also, to be consistent with the Special and Differential 
Treatment (SDT) provisions in the July 2004 Framework, least-developed countries 
(LDCs) are not required to undertake any reduction in commitments. For non-agricultural   20
commodities, developed countries are assumed to cut bound tariffs by 50 percent, 
developing countries by two-thirds of 50 percent, and LDCs no cuts. Using the version 6 
of the GTAP database and the tariffs rates from the MacMap-HS6 database, the GTAP 
model generates scenarios involving Doha with SDT (Doha-SDT) and Doha without 
SDT (Doha-All). 
However, to avoid implementing national policy reforms twice, once in the global 
model and once in the national model, we implemented a two-step approach. In the first 
step the GTAP model was simulated without the Philippine trade reforms. The GTAP 
results from this step would capture the impact on the world market of policy reforms in 
all countries, except the Philippines. In the second step, we adopted these results as 
shocks into the Philippine model and work out various Philippine policy reform 
experiments.  
In all Philippine simulation experiments, the calibrated tariff rates in the 
Philippine model, which are initially set at 1994 levels, are re-calibrated to the 2001 tariff 
rates used in the GTAP model for the Philippines. The solution of the model using the re-
calibrated tariff rates serves as the base model to which all subsequent policy simulations 
are compared. For all but the last scenario, the GTAP world model is run separately to 
generate estimates of the resulting changes in world prices for Philippine exports and   21
imports, demand for Philippine exports, and, in the case of the Doha scenarios, new 
Philippine tariff rates
5. The following experiments are conducted and analyzed: 
1.  Doha with Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for developing countries and 
indirect tax as replacement tax (Doha-SDT) 
2.  Doha without SDT for developing countries and indirect tax as replacement tax 
(Doha-All) 
3.  Free world trade, full domestic liberalization
6 and indirect tax as replacement tax. 
4.  Free world trade, full domestic liberalization and income tax as replacement tax. 
5.  Free world trade, no domestic liberalization and indirect tax as replacement tax. 
6.  Full domestic liberalization, no world trade liberalization and indirect tax as 
replacement tax. 
Experiments (1) and (2) are the Doha scenarios. These simulations involve Doha-
specified reductions in world and domestic tariff rates, export subsidies and domestic 
support. Under scenario (1), developing countries are required to make smaller reductions 
under Special and Differential Treatment (SDT), whereas no such treatment is granted 
under scenario (2). An indirect tax is introduced to compensate lost domestic tariff 
revenue in both scenarios. Scenarios (3) and (4) are the full (world and domestic) 
liberalization scenarios, involving the elimination of all world and domestic import 
                                                      
5 Tariff rate changes are derived from GTAP-estimated variations in the power of tariffs under Doha 
scenarios. If x is the tariff rate, the power of tariff is p_tm = (1+ x/100). GTAP generates results for p_tm, 
which in turn is used to compute the new tariff rate. 
6 All domestic tariffs are set to zero.   22
tariffs, under two alternative replacement tax schemes: indirect tax and income tax, 
respectively. Finally, scenarios (5) and (6) isolate the respective impacts of free world 
trade and full domestic liberalization from scenario (3). 
Table 7 summarizes the 2001 tariff rates for the Philippines, as well as the 
variations in world import and export prices, world export demand and Philippine import 
tariff rates as estimated by the GTAP world model. Given the agricultural focus of the 
Doha negotiations, it is important to recall that almost all Philippine trade is industrial in 
nature, although food processing represents roughly ten percent of exports (Table 6). We 
first note that the results of the two Doha scenarios are very similar in terms of their 
impacts on world prices and demand for Philippine exports and world prices for 
Philippine imports.  
With the exception of fruit, world export prices increase slightly (by less than one 
percent) under the two Doha scenarios, whereas variations are greater, although more 
often negative, in the case of full liberalization. Much more substantial impacts are noted 
in terms of world demand for Philippine exports, particularly under full liberalization. 
These impacts are strongly positive for Palay rice
7, textiles and garments and a number of 
food processing industries (meat/fish processing, sugar and beverages). However, they 
are moderately negative for several agricultural products (fruit, sugarcane and, in the case 
of the Doha scenarios, livestock) and certain manufacturing and service sectors.  
 
                                                      
7 As Palay rice exports were practically nil in the base year, these large percentage increases have no actual 
impact on the results.   23
Table 7—GTAP-Simulated World Prices and Demand Variations 
  
2001 
GTAP     Doha-SDT     Doha-ALL     Full Liberalization 
  Tariffs for    Export  Import New     Export  Import New     Export  Import
Sectors  Philippines     Price Volume Price  Tariff*    Price Volume Price  Tariff*     Price Volume Price 
AGRICULTURE 
Irrigated Palay  20.9      3.6 20.9     3.4 20.9       8.3
Non-irrigated  Palay                          
Corn  25.7 0.2 3.8 1.9 22.6 0.2 3.7 1.8 22.6    -1.6 35.4 8.4
Banana  8.8 -0.2 -6.3 0.9 7.6 -0.3 -6.4 0.8 7.6   -1.9 -6.3 2.2
Fruits  8.8 -0.2 -6.3 0.9 7.6 -0.3 -6.4 0.8 7.6   -1.9 -6.3 2.2
Coconut  8.8 -0.2 -6.3 0.9 7.6 -0.3 -6.4 0.8 7.6   -1.9 -6.3 2.2
Sugarcane  0.0 0.7 -22.9 1.5 0.0 0.7 -23.1 1.4 0.0    -1.4 -33.1 2.3
Other  agricultural  crops  4.7 0.3 -0.7 2.0 4.7 0.3 -0.8 1.9 4.7   1.9 49.9 8.2
Hog  3.0 0.5 -7.9 2.3 3.0 0.4 -7.9 2.3 3.0    -0.7 39.4 6.6
Chicken, egg & other 
poultry  products  3.0 0.5 -7.9 2.3 3.0 0.4 -7.9 2.3 3.0    -0.7 39.4 6.6
Other livestock  5.9  0.1 -0.4 1.4 5.0 0.1 -0.4 1.4 5.0    -1.5 10.8 4.4
Fishing  4.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 4.1 0.4 0.4 0.6 4.1   1.4 2.5 2.1
Other  Agriculture  0.1     0.6 0.1     0.6 0.0       1.8
INDUSTRY 
Mining  3.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 3.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 3.0   0.9 2.0 0.6
Meat Processing  17.8  0.2 41.3 0.7 14.3 0.1 41.5 0.7 14.3    -0.4 172.3 0.0
Canning of fruits, 
vegetables, etc  6.2 0.4 3.7 0.5 6.1 0.4 3.8 0.5 6.1   0.5 16.9 0.6
Fish canning & processing  30.2  0.1 36.4 0.0 20.6 0.1 36.7 0.0 20.6    -0.4 170.8 -2.2
Coconut  processing  6.2 0.4 3.7 0.5 6.1 0.4 3.8 0.5 6.1   0.5 16.9 0.6
Rice & corn milling  49.9  0.1 -36.0 0.1 49.9 0.1 -36.0 0.1 49.9    -2.1 -24.6 6.8
Sugar milling & refining  46.7  0.5 56.7 4.8 39.2 0.5 56.5 4.8 39.2   0.3 188.4 6.7
Beverages, sugar, 
confectionery, etc  11.1 0.3 22.7 1.0 10.4 0.3 22.7 1.1 10.4   0.5 108.8 2.6
Other food manufacturing  5.2  0.4 2.4 1.9 5.1  0.4 2.5 1.9 5.1    1.1 12.3 3.0
Textile and garments  6.5  0.5 11.0 0.4 6.5 0.4 10.8 0.3 6.5    -0.7 44.9 0.7
Wood_paper products  4.7  0.3 -1.9 0.3 4.7 0.3 -1.9 0.3 4.7   0.6 3.8 1.1
Fertilizer  4.5 0.2 3.4 0.1 4.5 0.2 6.2 0.1 4.5    -0.6 28.6 0.4
Other  chemicals  4.5 0.2 3.4 0.1 4.5 0.2 6.2 0.1 4.5    -0.6 28.6 0.4
Petroleum_related 
products  2.7 0.1 0.9 0.1 2.7 0.1 1.5 0.1 2.7    -2.0 13.3 -0.2
Metal and related products  3.9 0.3 -2.1 0.2 3.9 0.3 -2.7 0.2 3.9   1.0 -3.7 0.6
Semi_conductors & others  0.1  0.2 -1.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 -1.6 0.1 0.1   0.5 -3.4 0.4
Motor vehicles & other 
machineries  3.9 0.2 -1.2 0.2 3.9 0.2 -0.5 0.2 3.9    -0.3 9.0 0.5
Other manufacturing  5.1  0.4 -4.0 0.2 5.1 0.3 -3.8 0.3 5.1   0.6 -2.0 0.9
Construction and utilities  0.0  0.3 -1.4    0.3 -1.3    1.2 -3.6 
SERVICES 
Wholesale  trade  0.0  0.3 -0.9    0.3 -0.8    1.1 -1.6 
Other service  0.0  0.3 -1.2     0.3 -1.1    1.7 -4.5 
Government services  0.0   0.3 -1.2         0.3 -1.1         1.8 -5.4    24
On the import side, world prices increase for almost all imports, with the strongest 
increases among agricultural goods and under full liberalization. The changes in 
Philippine tariff rates are minimal under both Doha scenarios, as these reductions apply 
to bound tariff rates, which are much higher than the applied tariff rates presented in 
Table 7. Under the full liberalization scenario, all Philippine import tariffs are eliminated. 
The net impacts of these changes on the agricultural sector, which is the source of 
the income for most of the poor, are difficult to anticipate. While world prices and 
demand fall for a number of agricultural exports, reduced import competition (higher 
world import prices) and increased world prices and demand for agro-industrial exports 
are likely to have positive effects on domestic demand for agricultural goods. We now 
turn our attention to the simulation results from our CGE model to try to sort these (and 
other) different effects out and to determine the net poverty impacts. 25 
9. SIMULATION  RESULTS 
DOHA SIMULATIONS 
These simulations involve Doha-prescribed reductions in world and domestic 
tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support with and without special and differential 
treatment for developing countries. Resulting variations in world import and export 
prices, export demand and domestic tariffs as estimated by the GTAP model are 
presented in Table 7. There is little difference between these two scenarios in the specific 
case of the Philippines. 
Macro Effects: The macro effects of the two Doha simulations are almost 
identical (Table 8). On average, export prices (0.41 percent) increase more than import 
prices (0.21 percent). The driving factor behind the higher average price increase for 
Philippine exports is the increase in world demand (Table 7). Domestic producers 
increase their export volumes in response, simultaneously reducing their local sales. The 
combination of reduced local sales and increased import and export prices raises 
domestic consumer and output prices. As local prices increase relative to imports prices, 
Philippine consumers substitute toward imports. 
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Table 8—Macro Effects (percent change from base)  
         Full     Free World Trade (FT) 
Doha    Liberalization    vs Dom Lib (DL) 
SDT  All    Ind. Tax Dir. Tax   FT  DL 
Macro items\Scenarios  1  2     3  4     5  6 
Overall nominal tariff rate  0  -1    -100  -100    0  -100 
Domestic  prices             
Imports 0.21 0.21  -2.41 -3.23  0.56 -2.94
Exports 0.41 0.41  0.91 0.90  1.55 -0.63
Domestically-sold output  0.37 0.37 -0.01 -0.83  1.63 -1.61
Household CPI  0.39 0.39  -0.33 -1.16  1.71 -2.00
Total output  0.41 0.42  -0.46 -0.42  1.79 -2.21
Real exchange rate change*  -0.01 0.00 1.68 1.68  -0.03 1.70
Domestic  volumes             
Imports 0.15 0.16  4.37 4.35  0.74 3.61
Exports 0.13 0.14  3.88 4.05  0.24 3.63
Domestically-sold output  -0.01 -0.01  -0.96 -0.93  0.00 -0.96
Total consumption  0.03 0.03 0.16 0.17  0.15 0.01
Total output  0.02 0.02   0.04 0.10   0.05 -0.02
* = including indirect taxes; ** = World export price/domestic output price;  
Ind. Tax - indirect tax, Inc. Tax - income tax. 
 
Sectoral Trade, Output and Consumption: The Doha results suggest that such as 
an agreement is likely to lead to reallocation of exports and production from the inward-
oriented agricultural and service sectors toward the export-oriented industrial sectors for 
reasons we will now explore. Table 7 presents the world import price, export price and 
export demand effects of the Doha SDT scenario according to the 35 sectors of our CGE 
model. While world export prices and demand increase overall, they decline in the 
agricultural sector. In response, local agricultural producers reorient a share of their sales 
to the domestic market, whereas industrial producers turn increasingly to the export 
market (Table 9). This development is reinforced by the greater increase in the world 
prices of agricultural imports relative to industrial imports (Table 7), which lead domestic 
consumers to substitute agricultural imports by domestically-produced agricultural   27
products (Table 9). This also explains why consumer prices rise more in the agricultural 
sector. However, when we account for the contrasting export price effects, output prices 
increase more in the industrial sector than in the agricultural or service sectors. 
Furthermore, when we take account of larger input cost savings for industrial sectors, we 
note that industrial sector value added prices (Table 10) increase much more (0.69 
percent) than for the agricultural (0.42) or service sectors (0.38). Producers respond by 
reallocating agricultural and service output toward the industrial sector. Within the 
industrial sector, the food processing and textile-garments sectors emerge as the main 
"winners" from the Doha accord, given strong growth in world demand (Table 7). Almost 
identical results are observed when we compare with the Doha-All scenario, as shown in 
the major sector results in Table 10.  
Factor Remuneration: All factor prices increase as a result of rising world export 
demand under the two Doha scenarios (Table 11). However, these increases are 
somewhat smaller for factors used intensively in the agriculture and service sectors, given 
the general reallocation of production toward the industrial sector and rising relative 
output prices for industrial goods. 
 28 
Table 9—Effects on Prices and Volumes (Doha-SDT)  
 
   Price Changes (percent)     Volume Changes (percent) 
Sectors  Import  Export Dom. Cons. Output    Import Export Dom. Cons. Output 
Irrigated Palay  3.5    0.3 0.3 0.3 -15.1  0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-irrigated Palay      0.3 0.3 0.3      0.0 0.0 0.0
Corn -0.7  1.2 0.3 0.2 0.3  1.3 1.2  0.0 0.1 0.0
Banana   -0.9 0.9 0.9 -0.1    -3.9  -0.4 -0.4 -2.5
Fruit -0.3  -1.2 0.4 0.3 0.2  1.4 -2.9  0.1 0.2 -0.3
Coconut   -1.2 0.6 0.6 0.4    -2.7  0.7 0.7 0.3
Sugarcane     1.0 1.0 1.0      1.3 1.3 1.3
Other agricultural crops  1.9  -2.1 0.3 0.3 0.2  -4.8 -7.3  0.2 0.1 -0.3
Hog 2.2    0.4 0.5 0.4  -3.5  0.0 -0.2 0.0
Poultry products  2.2  -0.9 0.3 0.4 0.4 -3.7 -2.6  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Other livestock  0.5  0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3  -0.4 -0.4  0.0 0.0 0.0
Fishing 0.5  0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8  1.0 0.0  0.4 0.4 0.3
Other Agriculture  0.7    0.2 0.3 0.3  -1.7  -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
AGRICULTURE 1.04  -0.34 0.45 0.46 0.42    -1.60 -2.12  0.16 0.12 -0.03
Mining 0.1  0.6 0.3 0.1 0.5  0.2 1.0  -0.9 -0.1 0.0
Meat Processing  -2.3  3.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2  10.2 12.0  -0.4 0.4 -0.4
Fruit/vegetable canning  0.3  1.0 0.4 0.4 0.6  0.1 1.2  0.0 0.0 0.4
Fish processing  -7.4  2.8 0.8 0.7 1.7  44.5 7.8  -0.9 -0.3 2.9
Coconut processing  0.3  1.0 0.3 0.4 0.8  0.3 1.5  0.3 0.3 1.1
Rice & corn milling  0.1  -5.3 0.4 0.3 0.4  0.7 -14.2  0.0 0.0 0.0
Sugar milling & refining  -0.6  6.3 0.5 0.4 1.2  3.0 15.7  -0.2 0.1 1.5
Beverages, sugar, etc  0.3  5.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.1 6.9  0.0 0.0 0.3
Other food processing  1.8  0.8 0.6 0.8 0.6  -2.6 0.8  0.4 -0.2 0.4
Textile and garments  0.4  1.5 0.8 0.6 1.3  1.3 2.4  -0.3 0.5 1.3
Wood/paper products  0.2  0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.7  -0.1 0.0 -0.3
Fertilizer 0.2  0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5  -0.1 0.7  -0.3 -0.2 0.1
Other chemicals  0.1  0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3  0.3 0.8  -0.2 0.0 0.0
Petroleum products  0.0  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.3 0.0  -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Metal products  0.2  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1  -0.2 -0.5  -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Semi-conductors 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.0 -0.5  -0.2 -0.1 -0.4
Machinery (inc. cars)  0.1  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2  0.1 -0.5  -0.1 0.0 -0.3
Other manufacturing  0.2  -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 -1.3  -0.1 0.0 -0.6
Construction/utilities   0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4   -0.6  0.0 0.0 0.0
INDUSTRY 0.20  0.62 0.34 0.29 0.44   0.18 0.68  -0.08 0.02 0.12
Wholesale trade    0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4    -0.4  0.0 0.0 -0.1
Other service    0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4    -0.5  0.0 0.0 -0.1
Government services          0.5           
SERVICES     0.14 0.36 0.36 0.35       -0.48  -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
TOTAL 0.21      0.37 0.34 0.41   0.15 0.13  0.00 0.03 0.02
* = including indirect taxes; Dom=Domestic sales of local output; Cons. = Total domestic consumption. 
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Table 10—Effects on Prices and Volumes by Major Sector (percent change from  
                   base year)  
   Prices     Volumes 
   Import Export  Dom. Cons. Output VA    Import Export Dom.  Cons. Output VA Labor 
1. Doha-SDT (Special Differential Treatment) 
Agriculture 1.04 -0.34 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.42 -1.60 -2.12 0.16 0.12 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05
Industry 0.20 0.62 0.34 0.29 0.44 0.69 0.18 0.68 -0.08 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.33
Service   0.14 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.38   -0.48 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.17
2. Doha-ALL (No Special Differential Treatment) 
Agriculture 0.98 -0.34 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.42 -1.49 -2.13 0.16 0.12 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05
Industry 0.20 0.62 0.34 0.29 0.44 0.69 0.19 0.68 -0.08 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.33
Service   0.17 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.40   -0.46 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.17
3. Full liberalization: free world trade and domestic liberalization with replacement indirect tax 
Agriculture -0.43 -0.80 -0.07 -0.09 -0.91 -1.13 -1.21 -1.72 -0.02 -0.04 -0.17 -0.12 -0.21
Industry -2.44 1.38 -0.40 -1.20 -0.55 -0.06 4.45 6.02 -1.77 0.48 0.24 0.16 0.65
Service   0.33 0.53 0.53 -0.20 -0.21   0.85 -1.77 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.29
4. Full liberalization: free world trade and domestic liberalization with replacement income tax  
Agriculture -1.27 -0.71 -0.72 -0.74 -0.72 -0.54 -0.85 -1.97 -0.02 -0.04 -0.19 -0.14 -0.26
Industry -3.26 1.33 -1.36 -2.10 -0.64 1.06 4.43 6.37 -1.65 0.55 0.43 0.29 1.02
Service   0.38 -0.21 -0.21 -0.10 0.43   0.65 -1.65 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.50
5. Free world trade 
Agriculture 5.11 0.28 2.33 2.39 2.35 2.67 -5.56 -5.32 0.48 0.34 0.00 0.01 0.02
Industry 0.50 1.98 1.40 1.10 1.71 2.51 0.83 1.71 -0.26 0.13 0.25 0.21 0.65
Service   0.95 1.61 1.61 1.65 1.84   -1.49 -0.26 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.39
6. Domestic liberalization 
Agriculture -5.23 -1.09 -2.34 -2.42 -3.17 -3.68 4.62 3.90 -0.53 -0.42 -0.16 -0.12 -0.22
Industry -2.91 -0.59 -1.77 -2.26 -2.23 -2.56 3.60 4.25 -1.50 0.36 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04
Service     -0.62 -1.05 -1.05 -1.82 -2.01     2.38 -1.50 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.13
Notes: Dom=Domestic sales of local production; Cons. = Consumption (domestic); VA = Value added. 
 
Table 11—Effects on Factor Remunerations (percent change from base year)  
   Wage rates                      
  Agriculture   Non-agriculture    Land    Returns to capital 
   Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled     rent     Agriculture Industry  Service  All 
Doha-SDT  0.31 0.31 0.56 0.61    0.30    0.53  0.74 0.30 0.49 
Doha-All  0.30 0.30 0.57 0.61    0.28    0.53  0.75 0.31 0.50 
Full Lib. (Ind. Tax)  -1.49  -1.49  -0.01  0.30    -2.08    -0.87  -0.18 -0.34 -0.37 
Full Lib. (Inc. Tax)  -0.91  -0.91  0.87 1.21    -1.48    -0.33  1.06 0.20 0.42 
Free  World  Trade 2.45 2.45 2.25 2.34    2.46    2.98  2.66 1.65 2.20 
Dom.  Lib  -3.80 -3.80 -2.23 -2.02      -4.41      -3.74  -2.83 -1.95 -2.53 
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Household Income: These variations in factor remunerations affect the income of 
different household groups according to their respective factor endowments (Table 12). 
We note that there is a stronger distinction between households headed by salaried 
workers (including civil servants) and those headed by the self/un-employed, than there is 
between urban and rural households. Whereas households with salaried heads derive 
most of their income from wages, households with self/un-employed heads are more 
dependent on capital and foreign income. Nonetheless, rural households do derive a 
somewhat larger share of income from agricultural factors (labor and agricultural capital), 
as compared to urban households. This is particularly true for rural households with low-
educated heads, who represent nearly three-quarters of the rural population. 
 
Table 12—Sources of Household Income at the base (percent)  
   Urban     Rural 
 Salaried  Civil  Self-employed Family   Salaried  Civil  Self-employed Family
Sources low-ed  hi-ed  servants  low-ed  hi-ed bus.      low-ed hi-ed servants  low-ed hi-ed bus. 
Skilled ag. labor  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 29.5  6.4 0.0 7.4 6.0
Unskilled ag. labor  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  61.9 0.0  0.8 18.9 0.0 7.5
Skilled prod. labor  0.0 66.3 62.2 0.0 26.1 8.6  0.0 51.1  59.8 0.0 20.2 4.9
Unskilled prod. labor  66.5 0.0 3.7 22.1 0.0 2.8  19.3 0.0  5.2 10.2 0.0 4.4
Capital in Agriculture  1.2 0.5 0.9 10.8 2.0 5.3 2.7 1.4  3.9 30.1 17.5 29.8
Capital in Industry  0.8 0.8 0.4 2.9 1.9 12.0  0.6 0.4  0.4 2.1 1.8 5.6
Capital in Service  17.7 15.2 18.5 38.2 34.9 54.0 7.0 8.8  9.5 16.7 22.3 22.9
Land Rent  0.6 0.4 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.1  0.9 0.9  3.0 3.1 3.1 2.9
Dividends 4.0 10.1 4.1 3.8 13.9 8.7  0.6 2.2  3.1 2.1 7.3 6.1
Government Transfers  5.1 3.2 3.7 9.9 7.0 3.3  3.3 3.2  3.6 7.8 8.3 3.9
Foreign Income  4.1 3.5 5.3 10.4 12.8 4.2  3.6 2.5  4.3 9.2 12.1 5.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Legend: Low-ed – zero education to third year high school; hi-ed – high school graduate and up; ag. –  agriculture; 
prod. – production; bus. – business. 
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Household income changes for the various scenarios are summarized in Table 13. 
Rising factor remunerations under the two Doha scenarios translate into increases in 
income for all household groups. Rural households have slightly smaller income gains on 
average, although the sources – agriculture vs. non-agricultural income – of these gains 
are quite different. Urban and rural households headed by salaried workers, including 
civil servants, gain most given the high share of (non-agricultural) production wages in 
their income. The sole exceptions are households headed by low-educated rural salaried 
workers – the second poorest household category – who rely heavily on unskilled 
agricultural wages. Incomes of urban and rural households headed by the self/un-
employed also have smaller nominal income gains, given the smaller share of production 
wages and high shares of agricultural and service capital remuneration in their income.  
Poverty: In the FGT calculation, poverty effects come from two sources: (i) from 
the change in household income; and (ii) from the change in consumer prices, which 
affects the nominal value of the poverty line. The results of the calculations for the three 
poverty indices, headcount, gap, and severity, are presented in Table 14. Variations are 
presented with respect to initial values presented in Table 5. Recall, from table 5, that 
poverty in both rural and urban areas is highest for the low-educated households, which 
represent over 60% of the total population.  
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Table 13—Changes in Household Income and Sources (percent change from base) 
   Doha-SDT     Doha-All     Free World Trade (indirect tax) 
 After  Non   After  Non    After  Non 
Household Type  tax  Total Ag.  Ag.    tax  Total Ag. Ag.    tax  Total Ag.  Ag. 
URBAN 0.37 0.37 0.02 0.35 0.38 0.380.02 0.36 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07
low-ed salaried  0.47 0.47 0.01 0.46 0.48 0.480.01 0.47 0.12 0.12 -0.03 0.13
hi-ed salaried  0.43 0.43 0.00 0.42 0.44 0.440.00 0.44 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06
civil servants  0.44 0.44 0.01 0.42 0.45 0.450.01 0.44 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06
low-ed self-employed  0.33 0.33 0.06 0.27 0.34 0.340.06 0.28 -0.19 -0.19 -0.13 -0.07
hi-ed self-employed  0.28 0.28 0.02 0.27 0.29 0.290.02 0.28 -0.17 -0.17 -0.04 -0.12
family business  0.35 0.35 0.04 0.32 0.36 0.360.04 0.33 -0.24 -0.24 -0.07 -0.16
RURAL 0.36 0.37 0.18 0.18 0.36 0.360.18 0.19 -0.61 -0.60 -0.58 -0.02
low-ed salaried  0.35 0.35 0.20 0.15 0.34 0.340.19 0.15 -0.93 -0.93 -0.96 0.04
hi-ed salaried  0.42 0.42 0.11 0.34 0.42 0.420.11 0.34 -0.50 -0.50 -0.45 -0.02
civil servants  0.45 0.45 0.07 0.37 0.46 0.460.07 0.37 -0.22 -0.22 -0.20 -0.02
low-ed self-employed  0.36 0.36 0.23 0.12 0.36 0.360.23 0.13 -0.61 -0.61 -0.59 -0.03
hi-ed self-employed  0.32 0.32 0.11 0.20 0.32 0.320.11 0.21 -0.39 -0.39 -0.31 -0.07
family business  0.38 0.38 0.21 0.16 0.38 0.380.21 0.16 -0.56 -0.56 -0.52 -0.02
Total 0.37 0.37 0.08 0.29   0.37 0.380.07 0.30  -0.28 -0.28 -0.23 -0.05
  Free World Trade (income tax) 
Free World Trade, No Domestic 
Lib. 
Domestic Lib, No Free Wolrd 
Trade 
 After  Non   After  Non    After  Non 
Household Type  tax  Total Ag.  Ag.  tax  Total Ag. Ag.  tax  Total Ag.  Ag. 
URBAN -1.35 0.48 -0.02 0.50 1.64 1.640.12 1.52 -1.72 -1.73 -0.16 -1.57
low-ed salaried  -0.94 0.84 0.00 0.85 1.92 1.920.04 1.87 -1.78 -1.78 -0.08 -1.72
hi-ed salaried  -1.29 0.61 -0.01 0.62 1.79 1.790.03 1.76 -1.83 -1.83 -0.03 -1.80
civil servants  -1.25 0.61 -0.04 0.62 1.86 1.860.06 1.79 -1.93 -1.93 -0.08 -1.84
low-ed self-employed  -1.44 0.33 -0.05 0.39 1.60 1.600.37 1.22 -1.75 -1.75 -0.48 -1.26
hi-ed self-employed  -1.50 0.30 -0.02 0.32 1.31 1.310.10 1.22 -1.45 -1.45 -0.14 -1.32
family business  -1.46 0.35 -0.02 0.37 1.66 1.660.20 1.47 -1.86 -1.86 -0.24 -1.61
RURAL -1.79 -0.04 -0.31 0.27 2.01 2.011.23 0.79 -2.55 -2.55 -1.75 -0.79
low-ed salaried  -2.04 -0.33 -0.59 0.27 2.21 2.211.62 0.59 -3.04 -3.04 -2.50 -0.52
hi-ed salaried  -1.58 0.19 -0.27 0.46 2.09 2.090.79 1.33 -2.54 -2.54 -1.20 -1.29
civil servants  -1.32 0.49 -0.10 0.63 2.00 2.000.35 1.64 -2.18 -2.18 -0.52 -1.64
low-ed self-employed  -1.84 -0.11 -0.29 0.18 2.01 2.011.44 0.57 -2.55 -2.55 -1.96 -0.59
hi-ed self-employed  -1.67 0.09 -0.16 0.23 1.65 1.650.79 0.88 -2.00 -2.00 -1.05 -0.93
family business  -1.82 -0.02 -0.23 0.21 2.04 2.041.30 0.75 -2.54 -2.54 -1.77 -0.78
Total -1.50 0.31 -0.12 0.43   1.77 1.770.49 1.28  -2.01 -2.00 -0.69 -1.31
Notes: Ag. = Agricultural income; Non-Ag = Income from non-agricultural sectors; Lib. = Liberalization; ind. tax = 
Indirect tax; inc. tax = Income tax; Low-ed – zero education to third year high school; Hi-ed – high school graduate and 
up. 
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Table 14—Poverty Indices (percent change from base)  
   Doha     Full liberalization   Free world    Domestic 
  SDT  All    Ind. tax Inc. tax   trade    Liberalization 
   1  2     3  4    5     6 
   Headcount Index 
URBAN 0.02 0.02  -0.46 0.26  0.10  -0.49
low-ed salaried  0.00 0.00  -0.85 -0.33  0.00  -0.47
hi-ed salaried  -0.22 -0.22  -0.48 0.30  -0.43  -0.22
civil servants  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
low-ed self-employed  0.10 0.10  -0.27 0.50  0.15  -0.52
hi-ed self-employed  0.00 0.00  -0.43 0.76  0.76  -0.97
family business  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80  0.00  0.00
RURAL 0.05 0.05  0.20 0.65  -0.29  0.58
low-ed salaried  0.00 0.00 0.30 0.83  -0.68  1.32
hi-ed salaried  0.00 0.00 1.02 1.55  -0.98  1.55
civil servants  0.00 0.00  -0.81 0.00  -1.36  0.00
low-ed self-employed  0.04 0.04  0.20 0.61  -0.17  0.40
hi-ed self-employed  0.32 0.32 0.00 0.73  0.32  0.00
family business  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.19  0.00
Total 0.04 0.04  -0.02 0.52  -0.16 0.21
   Poverty Gap 
URBAN 0.02 0.00  -0.55 0.26  0.07  -0.60
low-ed salaried  -0.15 -0.16  -1.10 -0.62  -0.32  -0.74
hi-ed salaried  -0.16 -0.19  -0.67 0.62  -0.38  -0.27
civil servants  -0.16 -0.20  -0.56 0.52  -0.60  0.08
low-ed self-employed  0.10 0.09  -0.32 0.47  0.24  -0.57
hi-ed self-employed  0.23 0.23  -0.31 1.02  0.87  -1.16
family business  0.05 0.03 0.07 0.93  -0.08  0.15
RURAL 0.09 0.09  0.47 1.17  -0.48  0.91
low-ed salaried  0.12 0.13 1.01 1.56  -0.78  1.75
hi-ed salaried  -0.05 -0.05 0.29 0.86  -0.79  1.10
civil servants  -0.15 -0.15  -0.24 0.40  -0.71  0.50
low-ed self-employed  0.08 0.08  0.36 1.07  -0.40  0.72
hi-ed self-employed  0.15 0.14 0.05 1.03  0.12  -0.09
family business  0.05 0.04 0.45 1.45  -0.70  1.12
Total 0.07 0.07  0.14 0.88  -0.30 0.42
   Poverty Severity 
URBAN 0.00 0.00  -0.66 0.28  0.08  -0.74
low-ed salaried  -0.18 -0.20  -1.28 -0.71  -0.37  -0.87
hi-ed salaried  -0.15 -0.22  -0.74 0.67  -0.45  -0.30
civil servants  -0.22 -0.22  -0.65 0.54  -0.65  0.11
low-ed self-employed  0.13 0.12  -0.41 0.58  0.29  -0.71
hi-ed self-employed  0.24 0.19  -0.34 1.06  0.92  -1.26
family business  0.04 0.04 0.07 1.04  -0.11  0.18
RURAL 0.11 0.11  0.58 1.47  -0.61  1.14
low-ed salaried  0.15 0.16 1.27 1.96  -0.97  2.19
hi-ed salaried  -0.05 -0.05 0.35 0.99  -0.92  1.27
civil servants  -0.17 -0.17  -0.28 0.49  -0.84  0.59
low-ed self-employed  0.11 0.11  0.46 1.37  -0.51  0.94
hi-ed self-employed  0.20 0.20 0.08 1.36  0.16  -0.12
family business  0.06 0.04 0.50 1.64  -0.79  1.27
Total  0.08 0.08   0.19 1.10   -0.39   0.5534 
Overall, poverty slightly increases under the Doha scenarios, regardless of the 
indicator used (Table 14). This deterioration in poverty is due to the fact that 
consumption prices rise more on average than household nominal incomes, primarily due 
to the small deterioration in terms of trade
8. In general, rural households are somewhat 
more affected than urban households, as their nominal incomes increase less (Table 13) 
and their consumer price indices (not shown) increase slightly more. There is a strong 
contrast between households headed by the self/un-employed and rural households, for 
whom poverty increases, and those headed by salaried workers (including civil servants 
but excluding rural low-educated workers), for whom poverty declines. This is due to 
strong increases in production worker wages. The sole exceptions are households headed 
by low-educated rural wage workers, for whom poverty increases as a result of their 
reliance on unskilled agricultural wages. Indeed, the greater increase in rural poverty can 
be primarily traced to the contrasting impacts on low-educated workers in rural and urban 
areas (Table 12). 
In summary, these scenarios suggest that the Doha accords will increase poverty 
for all household categories, as consumer prices rise more than household incomes. 
Poverty increases more among rural households and the urban- self/un-employed. These 
results can be traced back to the finding from the GTAP world model that the Doha 
accords are likely to increase world prices and demand for Philippines industrial exports, 
                                                      
8 No major differences in consumption patterns are noted among household groups as all groups devote 
roughly 10 percent of their consumption to agricultural goods, 50-60 percent to industrial goods and 30-40 
percent to services. Thus, we do not explore the differential consumption price effects for each household 
group.   35
while reducing world prices and demand for Philippines agricultural exports. As a result, 
the inward-oriented agricultural and service sectors contract, while the export-oriented 
industrial sector expands. Whereas rural households suffer from the resulting fall in 
relative returns to agricultural factors, the urban self/un-employed suffer from declining 
returns to service-sector capital. 
FULL LIBERALIZATION SIMULATIONS 
These simulations involve the complete elimination of import tariffs in the 
Philippines and the rest of the world. According to the GTAP world model, this would 
lead to increased world import prices and export demand, along with reduced world 
export prices (Table 7). 
Macro Effects: The macro impacts of the full liberalization scenarios are 
substantially larger than those of the Doha scenarios, regardless of the choice of 
replacement tax (Table 8). The elimination of domestic tariffs reduces domestic import 
prices by 2.41 to 3.23 percent despite increasing world import prices. At the same time, 
increased world demand for Philippine exports offset falling world export prices such that 
domestic export prices rise by nearly one percent. In response, local producers reorient 
their production from the domestic market toward the export market at the same time as 
local consumers substitute toward cheaper imports. As local demand falls faster than 
local supply, local producer and consumer prices fall. The drop in local prices results in a 
depreciation in the real exchange rate of (1.68 percent), which reinforces the rise in 
exports and imports. When we compare the two replacement taxes, we note that import   36
and consumer prices fall more when lost tariff revenue is replaced by the introduction of 
a uniform income tax, but that volume responses are roughly the same. 
Sectoral Trade, Output and Consumption: In order to compare sectoral results 
with those of the Doha simulations, Table 10 breaks down the price and volume effects 
by major sector for all scenarios. Full liberalization leads to a smaller contraction in 
agricultural exports, but a much larger increase in industrial exports (Table 10), due to 
greatly increased world demand for the Philippines' industrial exports (Table 7). This is 
the main force driving the larger reallocation of domestic output, value added and labor 
from the agricultural and service sectors toward the industrial sector. Output and, more 
starkly, value added prices also fall more in the agricultural sector, as a result of declining 
export prices. At the same time, full liberalization leads to substantial reductions in 
import prices, particularly for industrial imports. This leads to an increase in industrial 
imports and a strong reduction in consumer prices for industrial goods. In a more 
disaggregate analysis, we trace industrial output expansion primarily to the textile-
garments sector and several food processing sectors (fish processing, coconut processing 
and fruit/vegetable canning). 
When we experiment with a compensatory income tax, import, domestic sales and 
consumer prices all fall more given the absence of a price-increasing indirect tax. 
However, as producers no longer need to absorb part of the indirect tax, output and value 
added prices fall less and, indeed, actually increase in the case of industrial and service 
value-added prices. Domestic production is consequently reoriented more markedly from 
the service sector in favor of the industrial sector.   37
Factor Remuneration: In the full liberalization scenario with a replacement 
indirect tax, all but unskilled wages drop, with the greatest reductions among agricultural 
factors (Table 11). This result can be traced primarily to the fall in domestic prices 
resulting from the removal of import tariffs. Agricultural factors lose most, as output is 
reoriented from the agricultural and service sectors toward the export-expanding 
industrial sector. Nominal factor remunerations fall less, and indeed increase in some 
cases, with the introduction a compensatory income tax, although the pro-industrial 
nature of the results remains intact. This can be explained by smaller domestic price 
reductions in the absence of a new indirect tax. 
Household Income: Under full liberalization with a compensatory indirect tax, all 
households suffer from declining nominal income with the exception of urban households 
headed by low-educated salaried workers (Table 13). This is the reflection of the general 
fall in factor remunerations (Table 11). The drop in income is more than five times 
greater for rural households than for urban households. This is due to their reliance on 
income from agricultural wages and/or agricultural capital (Table 12), for which the rates 
of remuneration both decline dramatically. Among rural households, it is precisely the 
poorest and most populous household categories – those with low-educated heads – who 
suffer most. Nominal income losses are even stronger when a compensatory income tax 
is used, despite the fact that nominal factor remuneration rates decline less and, in several 
cases, increase. This is due to the fact that the income tax is paid solely by households, 
whereas the indirect tax is shared among all domestic consumers. Although the difference   38
between urban and rural households is smaller, the pattern of impacts among urban and 
rural households remains the same. 
Poverty: The poverty effects with full (world and domestic) trade liberalization 
and a compensatory indirect tax (scenario 3) are interesting (Table 14). While the 
headcount index declines marginally by -0.02 percent, both the poverty gap and the 
severity indices increase (Table 8). The urban-rural contrast is dramatic with urban 
poverty declining and rural poverty increasing in roughly the same proportions as a result 
of the anti-agricultural impacts of full liberalization. Indeed, poverty declines for most 
urban household groups, which are less tied to declining agricultural incomes, while it 
increases for most rural household groups. When a compensatory income tax is 
introduced instead, poverty increases for both urban and rural households, although more 
so among rural households. 
In conclusion, full liberalization generally increases poverty more than the Doha 
agreement. However, poverty actually falls among urban households. Once again, this is 
primarily due to the anti-agricultural nature of the world export price/demand and import 
price shocks resulting from full liberalization. The introduction of an income tax instead 
of an indirect tax to compensate lost tariff revenue results in greater poverty increases, as 
household bear the full weight of this tax.   39
WORLD AND DOMESTIC FREE TRADE SIMULATIONS 
In simulations 5 and 6, we break down the effects of eliminating all tariffs in the 
rest of the world (free world trade) and in the Philippines (domestic liberalization) from 
simulation 3. 
Macro Effects: We observe dramatically opposing price effects in these two 
scenarios (Table 8). While prices uniformly increase under free world trade, primarily as 
a result of increased export demand and prices, they fall under the domestic liberalization 
scenario as a result of falling import prices. However, both simulations result in increased 
trade, due to increased export demand under free world trade and increased import 
competition and real exchange rate devaluation under domestic liberalization. Whereas 
world free trade boosts trade through increased world export prices and demand, 
domestic liberalization does so through reduced domestic import prices. These 
contrasting price effects generally offset each other when free world trade and domestic 
liberalization are combined in simulation 3, whereas the export, import and consumption 
volume effects reinforce each other.  
Sectoral Trade, Output and Consumption: Contrasting results are also found in 
the sectoral analysis (Table 10). Free world trade leads to a reallocation of production 
from services to industry with agricultural output practically unchanged, whereas 
domestic liberalization pushes production from agriculture and, to a lesser extent, 
industry toward services. These contrasting effects can be linked to the strong increase in 
industrial export prices under free world trade, and increased competition from cheaper   40
agricultural and industrial imports under domestic trade liberalization. Rising agricultural 
import prices lead to a greater increase in agricultural prices under free world trade. In 
contrast, greater reductions in agricultural import and export prices bring down 
agricultural prices more than industrial and service prices with domestic liberalization. 
Factor Remuneration: The most dramatic contrast is observed in comparing the 
isolated nominal factor remuneration effects of free world trade and domestic 
liberalization (Table 11). Free world trade leads to strong increases in nominal factor 
remunerations, particularly for agricultural factors, as a result of increased import prices 
and export demand. In contrast, falling output and value added prices, particularly in the 
agricultural sector, under domestic liberalization lead to strong reductions in nominal 
factor remunerations that affect agricultural factors most. 
Household Income: Free world trade has strong positive effects on the nominal 
income of all household categories, particularly in rural areas, as agricultural factors are 
the biggest gainers (Table 12). In contrast, domestic liberalization reduces nominal 
income for all household categories, especially rural households. Once again, these 
results can be traced to the fall in factor remunerations, particularly among agricultural 
factors. 
Poverty: When we attempt to disentangle the impacts of free world trade (5) and 
full domestic liberalization (6), it becomes clear that free world trade is poverty-reducing, 
whereas domestic liberalization is poverty-increasing. This is due to the fact that the 
increases in nominal income (Table 13) outstrip the increase in the household CPI (Table 
8) under free world trade, whereas nominal income falls more than the household CPI   41
with domestic liberalization. Free world trade and domestic liberalization also have 
contrasting urban-rural effects. Whereas free world trade reduces rural poverty and 
increases urban poverty, the contrary is true of the domestic liberalization scenario. These 
results can be traced to the anti-agricultural impacts of domestic liberalization and the 
pro-agricultural effects of free world trade. 
10. CONCLUSION 
The series of policy experiments conducted in this paper show mixed effects. 
Poverty increases slightly with the implementation of expected Doha agreements, 
especially among rural households and the agricultural self/un-employed. These 
household categories include the poorest and most populous households in the 
Philippines. These results can be traced to the Doha-generated reduction in world prices 
and demand for Philippines' agricultural exports and the resulting increase in industrial 
output and, consequently, production worker wage rates. 
Full liberalization – involving free world trade and complete domestic 
liberalization – with a compensatory indirect tax (to offset lost tariff revenue) reduces the 
incidence of poverty marginally, but increases the poverty gap and poverty severity 
substantially. Poverty increases in rural areas and falls in urban areas, as full 
liberalization favors non-agricultural sectors over agricultural sectors. When an income 
tax is used instead of an indirect tax, poverty increases more and in both rural and urban 
areas, although the increase is larger in rural areas.   42
In order to understand our full liberalization results, we run separate simulations 
for free world trade and domestic liberalization. We discover that free world trade is 
poverty reducing and favors rural households, whereas domestic liberalization is poverty-
increasing and favors urban households. Under free world trade, income gains outstrip 
consumer price increases, particularly for rural households, who derive most of their 
income from agricultural factors. Agricultural factor remuneration increases as 
consumers turn away from increasingly expensive agricultural imports and bid up the 
price of locally produced agricultural goods. In contrast, domestic liberalization leads to 
increased poverty as household income falls more than consumer prices. Here, the anti-
rural bias stems from the fact that import prices fall more for agricultural goods than for 
industrial goods, as initial import-weighted average tariffs rates are higher for the former. 
In conclusion, the current Doha agreement appears likely to slightly increase 
poverty, especially in rural areas and among the unemployed, self-employed and rural 
low-educated. The Philippines is found to have every interest in pushing for more 
ambitious world trade liberalization, as free world trade holds out strong promise for 
reducing poverty. In contrast, domestic liberalization is found to likely increase poverty, 
suggesting that accompanying policies should be considered such as tying domestic 
liberalization to progress in free world trade. Whereas free world trade favors rural 
households and actually increases urban poverty, the opposite is true of domestic 
liberalization. This suggests that some regional compensatory policies should be 
considered. Similar contrasting effects are noted according to the employment status of   43
the household head – salaried vs. unemployed or self-employed; skilled vs. unskilled – 
implying that targeted accompanying policies may be important.   44
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 APPENDIX A   
The link was conceptualized by Horridge and Zhai (2005). The figure below 
shows graphically the initial equilibrium (point A) in both the GTAP and the Philippine 
model for agriculture. With Doha agreements, global demand expands to D*. This is due 
to the improvement in market access and the elimination of export subsidies and 
domestic support. If agriculture is freed from such market distortions, some resources 
would move to agriculture from other sectors. This would correspondingly expand the 
global supply to SG*, giving rise to a new global equilibrium at point B, where the price 
is Pg and quantity is Qg. On the other hand, for the Philippine model, supply will shift to 
SN*, giving rise to a new equilibrium at point C, where the price is Pn and the quantity is 
Qn. Therefore, GTAP model would generate sets of equilibrium points which are 
different from the Philippine model. 










Pg B: new global equilibrium
SN* after Doha
Qn
Pn C: new national equilibrium
Note: price and quantity changes from national models not same as from global model
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To implement this link in the simulation exercises, we did the following: 
1.  Impose the new set of sectoral Armington elasticities of the GTAP model (Hertel, 
et al 2004) into the sectoral export demand elasticities in the Philippine model. 
2.  Impose one-half the values of the Armington elasticities of the GTAP into the 
CES and CET elasticities in the Philippine model. 
3.  Impose as shocks the GTAP results on sectoral changes in world prices of 
Philippine exports and imports, and demand for Philippine exports into the 
Philippine model.   49
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